کابل پرس

Afghanistan not a nation, just a battlefield for the West

Massoud Qiam — 2009-10-23T05:53:07Z

by Massoud Qiam

edited by Emily Withers

As strongly as the United States and NATO have worked to remove al Qaeda and the Taliban from Afghanistan, Pakistan is working equally as hard to keep them securely in place. The attack last week at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in Nuristan province, killing 8 U.S. soldiers, was the deadliest attack on U.S forces in over a year. This is exactly the type of militancy the Pakistani secret service is planning and overseeing— attacks specifically directed at discouraging foreign governments from sending more troops.

The Taliban is not completely controlled by Pakistan, but they do utilize military intelligence from and are financially supported by Pakistan. Pakistan plants the idea, for instance, of attacking NATO troops in the north or killing soldiers from nations— such as Germany, Italy, and France— that are already debating whether or not to pull troops out. They are putting more pressure on NATO as well, with the goal of forcing the organization out of Afghanistan.

Though it may appear as a diversion, the Pakistani government did not invade the Swat Valley and kill thousands of Taliban soldiers to convince the west that they are actively fighting the Taliban. Pakistan, rather, simply does not want the Taliban in their country. The Pakistani government will not kill Talib in Afghanistan, only those within Pakistan.

Pakistan's government benefits from the support of Afghanistan's Taliban. When the Taliban gained troops and power, they began to disobey Pakistan's orders. For instance, Pakistan supported the U.S government's request that the Taliban hand over Osama Bin Laden, but the Taliban did not comply. Even if the Afghan Taliban obeys half of Pakistan's orders, the relationship will remain in tact. Pakistan doesn't want to control the Taliban completely, but it's important to them that they are able to direct Afghanistan for their own benefits.

Just as taking tablets for a headache has side effects on other parts of the body, Pakistan's encouraging of Afghans to become Talib has side effects within Pakistan. Keeping border areas secure is part of the plan to retain the insurgency in Afghanistan. In order for Pakistan to do this, they must encourage people living at the border between the two countries to become extremist fighters. The violence in these areas spills over onto Pakistan soil.

Sending in more foreign troops will assist those currently stationed to remove Talibs, but it won't completely fix the situation in Afghanistan. A fundamental problem is that American, European and even Afghan leaders don't recognize Afghanistan as a nation— they think of it as a battlefield. They strategize around their own political agendas, not around the well-being of the people of Afghanistan. It is imperative that they think about justice in such a socially conflicted country.

Britain and the U.S possess differences in their visions of strategy. Likewise, other European countries have their own points of view about Afghanistan, though they mostly stand on common ground in their support of human rights and democratic values. Negotiation with the Taliban is not the only issue. Success requires that foreign nations work together to devise strategies to make the country a safe zone. Should we control Afghanistan with the Taliban, or should we bring together Mujahedeen and the Taliban and make a coalition government? These are questions that must be asked and collectively decided upon.

Every day, we are witness to mass murders. Who commits these crimes? They are, of course, either in Mujahedeen or the Taliban. The Taliban is mainly supported by southern and eastern tribes, and the Mujahedeen are supported by northern and central tribes. These tribes fight one another for power.

Numerous Afghan politicians are not physically in the Taliban, but their sympathies lie with and support the Taliban. The Afghan government will never be able to talk directly with the Taliban, but we can force these corrupt leaders out of the government. If we bring justice, the Mujahedeen and the Taliban will not be able to solicit support from the people, and Afghan citizens will realize that criminals must be removed from within the governmental system. We must erase all opportunities for Pakistani politicians to abuse the Afghan people by pitting them against each other.

It is possible to accomplish this with the support of the international community. The people of Afghanistan cannot do it alone. Stability and security can be kept with short-term coalition governments. We have to see the problem from the root. Mujahedeen and the Taliban are playing the roles of political parties, but they are both criminal organizations that have been committing war crimes for the past 30 years. President Obama must consider transitional justice, and if the international community doesn't negotiate with the Pakistani government, the problem of the Taliban will remain.

Hold up, boy!

Massoud Qiam — 2009-05-29T05:43:00Z

On a warm summer day back in 2000, I was strolling down a Kabul street with my brother when I heard a voice from behind say, ‘Hold up boy.' I turned around and saw a Taliban religious policeman holding a whip; his violent eyes fixed on us. My heart hammered inside my chest.
He stepped closer and without moving his lips started lashing me and my brother with his leather whip. Pedestrians stared but walked briskly by. The Talib told us with contempt, ”you have grown your hair to attract women.” We were taken to a car with Arabic scripts painted on its doors. There they clipped our hair quickly and sloppily, then drove us away.

In just a few hours, the Taliban had swept up a large number of boys and men for the crime of trimming their beards, growing long hair, and not wearing a head covering. They gathered us together in a local prison across from what was once known as the Kabul Zoo. Criminals like me and my brother were held there for several days.

In downtown Kabul there is a pedestrian underground passage. I was very young when I came across an interesting but unusual scene. Two religious police stood at the entrance, picking men out and taking them to a corner. I wondered why the religious police would just pick a few and body search them hidden from the public eye. I walked over to a man who had just been let go.

“What's going on here?” I asked. The man grimaced, his eyes full of hatred and humiliation, answered: “They put a string inside my trousers to see if I had shaved my pubic hair.” The Ministry of Fighting Vice and Promoting Virtue says that the sunna commands the removal of pubic hair. This apparently is their idea of good hygiene, which is promoted by Islam.

In Kabul I occasionally came across such scenes. I once witnessed the beating of a woman by the Taliban. She had passed out, lying unconscious and in shock on the street. Such was daily life under the Taliban regime but we, but as Kabul citizens, were spared by the Taliban compared to those in rural areas. We listened on forbidden radios to news from the BBC of the slaughter of innocent people in the central regions.

Then along came 9/11. Although a tragedy resulting in the loss of thousands of innocent people, it was a sad blessing for Afghans, who had lost millions of loved ones through senseless violence and were living under the thumbs of one of the worst regimes in human history.

A month after the strikes against the U.S., the Taliban were removed from power. I and millions of my compatriots discussed the mysterious concept of democracy, the governance system promised by America. We didn't have the faintest idea of what it could be; some were saying it is equality of women and men, others said it was election of a government based on peoples' votes. Others said democracy is reconstruction, work, and welfare. Another said it was freedom of speech and thought.
I was starting to learn that democracy could bring freedom of thought when I began working for a local private radio station which had just begun broadcasting. From 2003 to 2006 were the best years for free speech, and gradually I became a famous face in Afghan media.

Photo by Fardin Waezi

The 06:30 Report

In 2004, I started a program on Tolo-TV, the most popular television station in Afghanistan. It later played a big role in Afghanistan's socio-political environment. I was only 22 years old, but was selected to conduct serious interviews with high ranking government officials. In an interview with President Karzai that lasted for over an hour I remember him in tears at the end. I interviewed many key regional and international leaders too. The 06:30 Report analyzed important matters like administrative corruption, the economic mafia, regional squabbles, and drug trafficking. It was the first television program in Afghanistan with investigative journalism at its heart.

After 2006 the program began facing censorship from regressive political figures, and finally in 2008 it was shut down. With it went down the drain all the hopes and ideas that the newly established democracy had created in my head. I have come to realize that all the efforts I undertook under the label of free expression were not the fruit of Bush's present of democracy. They were, in fact, the outcome of the bravery and dynamism created by the hope and rumors of change in the young people in Afghanistan; nothing more than that. Greater powers than us were at work, determined that real change would not come to Afghanistan.
George Bush, in his last speech as US president said ‘Afghanistan has undergone a change from being a country where Taliban and al-Qaeda would stone women to death in public to a democratic country which fights against terrorism.' This picture of Afghanistan is true to some extent, but on-the-ground realities have been superficially analyzed. Perhaps I am not being whipped for having a short beard or long hair, but my country is far from achieving real security; which is the supposed aim of U.S. and other foreign forces in Afghanistan.

The U.S. in its fight against terrorism eradicated the Taliban, but it seems to me that this war has made the Taliban more determined and stronger. It has also strengthened its ties with similar hard-line factions. The Taliban, instead of stoning women or accosting men in public, are beheading a large number of men, women, and children on the roadsides in their areas of control, accusing them of espionage or working for foreigners.

I realized just two years after their collapse in 2001, that the Taliban had entered a new phase; that of reinforcing itself. Since 2003, the war has raged wilder. Now that the Taliban have reached Kabul's gates, I can hear their voices from behind me, just like when they shouted at me on that hot summer day with my brother in 2000. ‘Hold up, boy!'

Interests and Allegiances in the Insurgency

Massoud Qiam — 2008-11-08T08:59:18Z

by: Massood Qiam

editorial assistance by Marc Seltzer

Worsening attacks against Afghan government officials, coalition forces, humanitarian-aid workers, and the civilian population do not simply reflect a regrouping of existing Taliban forces. The insurgency has significantly broadened because of public reaction in Afghanistan to the Karzai government and its NATO-led coalition backing. Opposition to Karzai is growing along tribal dividing lines with the elevation of Karzai's Durrani sect resulting in rebellion by rival Ghalzai tribesman. Moreover, continuing civilian casualties from coalition combat operations are stoking Afghan anger and lending support to those blaming instability and injustice on foreign forces. The future is perilous as the Taliban also remains a force with a new crop of commanders who are more extremist and bent on violence to achieve their goals. While the government and NATO-led coalition have substantial organized military and law enforcement resources at their disposal, the insurgency has nonetheless intensified.

A key to understanding why and how the Taliban are making a comeback is evident in the tribal structure of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most Afghans are Pashtun speakers; the major tribal subgroups are Ghalzai and Durrani. While the Ghalzais are the larger group in Afghanistan, the Durrani tribe has held power for most of the past 250 years. The Ghalzai tribe enjoyed political dominance and rule only during the brief period from 1978 until the U.S.-led invasion in 2001. Hamid Karzai and family are part of the Popalzai subgroup within the Durrani tribe. Thus, with the installation of the Karzai government, the Durrani were returned to power.

However, the Karazi government, while firmly in control in Kabul, struggled less successfully for nationwide authority. As the Karzai government attempted to solidify control, it shifted power to the Durranis including many relatives of Karzai, and weakened the position of the Ghalzai sect. This consolidation of national power extended the government́̒s influence in the South, Southwest, and East of Afghanistan during the early years of the new administration. However, longer term, it has also turned disenfranchised tribal groups away from the government and toward the insurgency. Looking at a tribal map of the turbulent areas of Afghanistan since 2003 confirms that the Ghalzai have fought a rebellion against the new Popalzai/Durrani government.

This is significant because the Ghalzais are the majority in Afghanistan, and number in the millions in Pakistan as well. The Ghalzais represent a far wider constituency than the Taliban or Al Qaeda circles of influence. The Ghalzai populations participation in the insurgency and collaboration with the Taliban has been fuelled by government and coalition policy and action. For example, sending elders of the Ghalzai tribe to Guantanamo prison camp was viewed as suppressing the Ghalzai tribe in the name of fighting terrorism. Additionally, the assassination of Taliban leaders (often Ghalzai tribal elders) by coalition forces has also had some unintended consequences. Followers in the larger Ghalzai community have been angered, and the inexperienced replacement commanders are extremists who do not shy away from any kind of violence to support their cause. They are also far less likely to tolerate cooperation between local Afghans and government or coalition forces.

Another disturbing occurrence, the killing of innocent civilians in the course of coalition raids or aerial bombings, shocks local populations. The Karzai government has raised protests against the civilian deaths in the course of attacks on Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives, but has not stopped coalition forces from taking military actions that place civilians at risk. Widely publicised tragic deaths give stimulus to Taliban recruiting and Al Qaeda fundraising. Blame is cast on the Karzai government and coalition forces.

Dominance of the Durrani tribe within positions of power in Afghanistan has also met with claims of corruption and abuse. Provincial governors who are Durrani have allegedly suppressed local police and judges. The 35 billion dollar (US) narcotics trade has change hands from Ghalzais to Durranis. The big merchants of opium that were Ghalzai are spending their lives in U.S. prisons. Only a scant amount the opium traffic benefits tribes that support the Taliban, yet the Afghan government is not as determined to eradicate poppy production now that it is a source of income for their tribal branch, and a common interest in opium commerce has brought the Taliban and criminal elements of the government together.

All of these concerns have been fundamental to the Taliban's appeal. These issues have resulted in significant support for the Taliban from non-Durrani members of the Afghan population. Mr. Karzai̒s situation has become so bad that he has invited Taliban, including Mullah Mohammed Omar, to the negotiating table, but has been rejected. The next presidential election does not bode well for Karzai or for the Popalzai/Durrani tribe. The other tribal groups within Afghanistan are talking about toppling Karzai and sending the Durrani into exile. Thus, Karzai is under great pressure to do anything required in order to win the election and stay in power.

From the Taliban perspective, uniting Afghans of various tribes and regions in a mission to achieve a strict Islamic state is familiar territory. Emerging in Kandahar in 1994, the Taliban originally grew out of a crisis of broken political structure and civil war after the collapse of the Soviet-installed communist regime. The group was composed of a young generation of Jihadis who believed that their leaders had become corrupt. The Taliban offered a return to a strict Muslim society and an end to warring factions, government corruption and lawlessness. While various Mujahedin warlords had proclaimed Jihad and liberation during the civil wars, thousands of civilians died in mass killings and oppression.

In the capital, Kabul, alone, an estimated 60,000 people lost their lives during this period. Since the Afghan people were weary of the crimes committed by the Jihad leaders and their followers, the Taliban quickly won public support. In fact, the Taliban were received as saviours. Anecdotes spread about their purity and sacredness. It was said that angels from heaven assisted the Taliban in their fight against the strayed Jihadi groups.

Mass killings, lootings and other oppression at the hands of the Mujahedin ended under Taliban rule. Islamic laws were strictly applied and the public sent their sons to join Taliban forces against its enemies. Security and peace were tightly maintained in regions under Taliban control. The Taliban was successful at uniting different tribal groups behind their leadership and went on to conquer 95% of Afghan territory. Remarkably, this was only a decade ago.

The Taliban changed with the arrival of Osama Bin Laden in 1998. Bin Laden was knowledgeable about the Islamic groups in Afghanistan from his participation in the Afghan wars against Russian occupation during the 1970s. While Bin Laden ostensibly hid in Afghanistan after the 1998 Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, his presence transformed the nature of the Taliban. The Taliban became a strong ally of Al Qaeda and took on more of an international political approach. From 1998 until 2001 the Islamic fundamentalism of the Taliban was blended with the extremism of the international terrorists and the income sources of the group multiplied. In fact, the group became, willy-nilly, part of the Al Qaeda's strategic
framework against the West.

Entertaining the idea of forming a multinational Islamic army, Al Qaeda saw the Taliban and the Afghan situation as the realization of their ideas. Training camps flourished. As Al Qaeda expressed support for the Muslims in Chechnya, Palestine and Kashmir and railed against foreign troops in the Middle East, the Taliban proclaimed the rights of Muslims worldwide. The number of non-Afghans from international terrorist groups increased among the Afghan fighters seeking to conquer the last 5% of Northern Afghanistan. Afghanistan became a hub of terrorist groups from Chechnya, Central Asia, Pakistan and the Middle East. Ultimately, Afghan training camps took recruits from throughout the Middle East and beyond and provided insurgency training.

After the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington D.C., the attention of the world was focused on the international ramifications of the extremist operations in Afghanistan. The United States invaded Afghanistan before the end of 2001, and the Taliban government quickly collapsed. Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders fled to the mountainous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The U.S.-led coalition was close on their trail. Had the U.S. continued an all-out pursuit, it might have captured or killed both Taliban and Al Qaeda officials making a serious challenge to their ability to recover. However, the Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders might have disappeared successfully into sympathetic local communities regardless of the efforts to find them.

In the beginning, Pakistan was the sole regional power supporting the Taliban and was crucial to its financing. Pakistan sought to create a week traditional system in Afghanistan to reinforce Pakistan's strategic position against rival India. Pakistan also had an interest in plans for an oil pipeline through Afghanistan from Turkmenistan. Support came from the Pakistan Army, the ISI (Pakistani intelligence service), and Pakistan's terrorist circles. Once the Taliban were able to obtain funds through a variety of sources such as Al Qaeda, they became more independent from Pakistani influence. However, the tribal and strategic connections remained.

A central tenant of the Bush administration's war on terror included demanding that Pakistan and other nations that habored or supported terrorists join the fight. The U.S. committed substantial foreign aid to the government of Pakistan and officially, at least, Pakistan is a partner in the war on terrorism. Undoubtedly, Pakistan has increased actions taken against Taliban and extremists. Unofficially, there is still reportedly support at the level of the intelligence service and generally throughout the border villages inhabited by or traversed by nomadic Ghalzais. Locals are not aligned with Karzai's Durrani tribe. Instead, as in Afghanistan, tribal loyalties sometimes lean towards the Taliban.

The Karzai government has repeatedly accused Pakistan of supporting attacks inside Afghanistan. The border is porous and funding and supply through Pakistan and international channels can easily be connected with the Taliban fighters. The main hub of the Taliban is now the Pakistani border areas. If the government and NATO want to destroy the main operations of the Taliban, they will have to start there and go beyond borders. Is it not a world war against the terrorists?

Massood Qiam

current affairs Tolo TV

massood.qiam@tolo.tv